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Noncooperative dynamics in election interference

Title: Noncooperative dynamics in election interference
Authors: Dewhurst, David Rushing; Danforth, Christopher M.; Dodds, Peter Sheridan
Source: Phys. Rev. E 101, 022307 (2020)
Publication Year: 2019
Collection: Physics (Other); Quantitative Finance
Subject Terms: Physics - Physics and Society; Economics - General Economics
Description: Foreign power interference in domestic elections is an existential threat to societies. Manifested through myriad methods from war to words, such interference is a timely example of strategic interaction between economic and political agents. We model this interaction between rational game players as a continuous-time differential game, constructing an analytical model of this competition with a variety of payoff structures. All-or-nothing attitudes by only one player regarding the outcome of the game lead to an arms race in which both countries spend increasing amounts on interference and counter-interference operations. We then confront our model with data pertaining to the Russian interference in the 2016 United States presidential election contest. We introduce and estimate a Bayesian structural time series model of election polls and social media posts by Russian Twitter troll accounts. Our analytical model, while purposefully abstract and simple, adequately captures many temporal characteristics of the election and social media activity. We close with a discussion of our model's shortcomings and suggestions for future research.; Comment: 33 pages (22 body, 11 appendix), 33 figures (15 body, 18 appendix), accompanying code at https://gitlab.com/daviddewhurst/red-blue-game
Document Type: Working Paper
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.101.022307
Access URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1908.02793
Accession Number: edsarx.1908.02793
Database: arXiv