| Title: |
Illegal interlocks among life science company boards of directors |
| Authors: |
Manjunath, Anoop; Kahrobai, Nathan; Lemley, Mark A; Kumar, Ishan |
| Source: |
Journal of Law and the Biosciences ; volume 11, issue 1 ; ISSN 2053-9711 |
| Publisher Information: |
Oxford University Press (OUP) |
| Publication Year: |
2024 |
| Description: |
Competition between life science companies is critical to ensure innovative therapies are efficiently developed. Anticompetitive behavior may harm scientific progress and, ultimately, patients. One well-established category of anticompetitive behavior is the ‘interlocking directorate’. It is illegal for companies’ directors to ‘interlock’ by also serving on the boards of competitors. We evaluated overlaps in the board membership of 2,241 public life science companies since 2000. We show that a robust network of interlocking companies is present among these firms. At any given time, 10–20 percent of board members are interlocked; the number of interlocks has more than doubled in the last two decades. Over half of these interlocked firms report over $5 million in historical revenue, exceeding a legal threshold that makes an interlocking directorate a violation of antitrust law. Those interlocks are only illegal if the companies compete, even in part. Using the disease categories for which companies have sponsored clinical trials, we discover that a few markets are responsible for a large fraction of interlocks. We show that in dozens of cases, companies share directors with the very firms they identify as their biggest competitive threats. We provide a data-driven roadmap for policymakers, regulators, and companies to further investigate the contribution of anticompetitive behavior to increased healthcare costs and to enforce the law against illegal interlocks between firms. |
| Document Type: |
article in journal/newspaper |
| Language: |
English |
| DOI: |
10.1093/jlb/lsae005 |
| Availability: |
https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsae005; https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article-pdf/11/1/lsae005/57227512/lsae005.pdf |
| Rights: |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.14CACA64 |
| Database: |
BASE |