Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications
| Title: | Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Vincent P. Crawford; Miguel A. Costa-gomes; Nagore Iriberri; Jel Codes C |
| Contributors: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: | http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CGCIJEL4April12/. |
| Publication Year: | 2012 |
| Collection: | CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: | coordination; salience; strategic communication |
| Description: | Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people’s strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people’s initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium “level-k ” or “cognitive hierarchy ” models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics. |
| Document Type: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.297.3060; http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CGCIJEL4April12/ |
| Availability: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.297.3060; http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CGCIJEL4April12/ |
| Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: | edsbas.21139298 |
| Database: | BASE |