| Title: |
Incentives to innovate in response to competition: The role of agency costs |
| Authors: |
Bessonova, Evguenia; Gonchar, Ksenia |
| Collection: |
RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) |
| Description: |
This paper investigates the role of managerial ownership and incentive payment as potential drivers of innovation decisions by firms and as shifters of the competition-innovation link in the Russian manufacturing industry, where poorly protected property rights and a path-dependent market structure (typical for many transition economies) lead to a variety of outcomes. We use recent survey-based microdata for nearly 2000 non-listed companies in Russia. Our results suggest that managerial ownership, which initially evolved as a means of protecting against and resisting dysfunctional institutions, may stimulate decisions to undertake R&D and risky product innovations. Further, managerial ownership and competition are complementary motivations for R&D and innovation. Incentive payment to hired managers is a positive commitment instrument but has no impact on the competition-innovation link. ; Agency costs; Managerial ownership; Incentive contract; Competition; Innovation |
| Document Type: |
article in journal/newspaper |
| Language: |
unknown |
| Relation: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362517300080 |
| Availability: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362517300080 |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.47E8C56C |
| Database: |
BASE |