Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken Arrow’s Theorem for One-Dimensional Single- Peaked Preferences
| Title: | Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken Arrow’s Theorem for One-Dimensional Single- Peaked Preferences |
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| Authors: | Jel Code D |
| Contributors: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: | http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1275. |
| Publication Year: | 2007 |
| Collection: | CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: | Arrovian Social Choice; One-Dimensional Continuum; Single-Peaked Preferences |
| Description: | In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we con-sider social welfare functions satisfying Arrows requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corollary we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voters preference is strictly quasi-concave. JEL Classi cation Numbers: D70, D71. |
| Document Type: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.539.8915; http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1275 |
| Availability: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.539.8915; http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1275 |
| Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: | edsbas.52577B79 |
| Database: | BASE |