| Title: |
A belief-based approach to signaling |
| Authors: |
Koessler, Frédéric; Laclau, Marie; Tomala, Tristan |
| Contributors: |
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion (GREGHEC); Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); ANR-11-IDEX-0003,IPS,Idex Paris-Saclay(2011) |
| Source: |
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04455227 ; 2026. |
| Publisher Information: |
CCSD |
| Publication Year: |
2026 |
| Subject Terms: |
belief-based approach; cheap talk; information transmission; incomplete information; signaling; [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance |
| Description: |
We provide a geometric characterization of the set of interim equilibrium payoffs in the general class of costly signaling games. Our characterization offers a unified, belief-based framework to study both cheap talk and costly signaling, with or without transparent motives. The key ingredient is the analysis of Bayes-plausible belief distributions and signal-contingent interim values that are incentive-compatible for the sender. Geometrically, this leads to a constrained convexification of the graphs of the interim value correspondences. We apply and illustrate the results in a class of intimidation games. We also derive the sender’s best equilibrium payoff under transparent motives. Finally, we compare the equilibrium outcomes to those arising when the sender can commit to a signaling strategy. |
| Document Type: |
report |
| Language: |
English |
| Availability: |
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04455227; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04455227v4/document; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04455227v4/file/bbs-v0.25.pdf |
| Rights: |
https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.85E35100 |
| Database: |
BASE |