| Title: |
To Work or to Work Out: A Moral–Hazard Interpretation of Labor Supply, Retirement, and Investments in Longevity |
| Authors: |
Stefan Hupfeld; Jel-classification H |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://www.uni-graz.at/socialpolitik/papers/Hupfeld.pdf. |
| Publication Year: |
2008 |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: |
Moral Hazard; Tax/Pension System; Investments in Longevity |
| Description: |
In a moral–hazard model, an agent engages in three different activities, labelled work, delayed retirement, and work out (investments in longevity). The latter imposes higher effort costs on weekly labor supply, but increases possibilities for life time labor supply. Work out does not accrue to the benefit of the principal. Second best incentives for work out are U–shaped in the agent’s ability, and so is the effort level supplied by the agent. This is supported by recent empirical evidence, showing that longevity is not always monotonously increasing in ability. Incentives for delayed retirement are decreasing in ability. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.399.1523 |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.399.1523; http://www.uni-graz.at/socialpolitik/papers/Hupfeld.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.86146DA8 |
| Database: |
BASE |