| Title: |
Screening when agents are the source of benefits |
| Authors: |
Nolan Miller; Er F. Wagner; Richard Zeckhauser; Jel-code D G |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://www.uni-graz.at/socialpolitik/papers/Wagner.pdf. |
| Publication Year: |
2008 |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: |
Screening; asymmetric information; risk aversion; target efficiency |
| Description: |
We consider agents as a source of welfare for a principal. The principal provides funds, and the benefits produced are known only to the source. If more productive sources are less risk-averse, the principal offers fixed and variable bundles to screen sources. The analysis reveals that the optimal lottery achieves great target efficiency. Indeed, when the ratio of marginal benefits approaches zero (or infinity) as allocations go to the lower permitted bound, the principal obtains the first-best arbitrarily closely. This is the case, for example, when source benefits exhibit constant relative risk aversion, or when occasional negative payments are allowed. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.319.7203 |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.319.7203; http://www.uni-graz.at/socialpolitik/papers/Wagner.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.A7E90814 |
| Database: |
BASE |