Elections and the Strategic Use of Budget Deficits
| Title: | Elections and the Strategic Use of Budget Deficits |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Roland Hodler; Jel Classification H; Simon Loertscher |
| Contributors: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: | https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name%3DESAM09%26paper_id%3D165. |
| Publication Year: | 2009 |
| Collection: | CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: | Voting; Budget deficits; Public Debt; Political Economics |
| Description: | We present a model in which a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending can strategically run a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from choosing high public spending if elected, and possibly also to ensure his own reelection. We find that the incumbent never manipulates the opposition candidate’s public spending if he can ensure his reelection; and that a conservative incumbent who runs a budget deficit to ensure his reelection may somewhat paradoxically choose high public spending before the election. |
| Document Type: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.361.1952 |
| Availability: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.361.1952 |
| Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: | edsbas.AD53C019 |
| Database: | BASE |