When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation
| Title: | When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Steve Cicala; Edward Glaeser; Joshua Gottlieb; William Hogan; Richard Hornbeck; Lawrence Katz; Greg Lewis; Andrew Waxman; Stan Veuger |
| Contributors: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: | http://economics.uchicago.edu/workshops/Cicala Steve When Does Regulation.pdf. |
| Publication Year: | 2014 |
| Collection: | CiteSeerX |
| Description: | This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal- and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas), and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion. |
| Document Type: | text |
| File Description: | application/pdf |
| Language: | English |
| Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.467.6209; http://economics.uchicago.edu/workshops/Cicala Steve When Does Regulation.pdf |
| Availability: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.467.6209; http://economics.uchicago.edu/workshops/Cicala Steve When Does Regulation.pdf |
| Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: | edsbas.AE8D088 |
| Database: | BASE |