David Spector †
| Title: | David Spector † |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Jel Codes L; Bernard Caillaud; Jeff Ely; Joseph Farrell; Zvika Neeman; Debraj Ray; Patrick Rey; Daniel Rubinfeld; Jean Tirole |
| Contributors: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: | http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/58/83/11/PDF/wp200707.pdf. |
| Publication Year: | 2007 |
| Collection: | CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: | exclusive dealing; foreclosure; exclusionary strategies |
| Description: | A Þrm may decide to have some of its customers sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. If contracts are required to be simple enough, this strategy may induce inefficient exclusion even if the excluded Þrm is present at the contracting stage. Exclusive contracts may thus cause inefficient eviction, not only entry-deterrence, even though the former is less likely than the latter. However, complex enough contracts, if feasible, would allow agents to reach a Pareto-optimum, without inefficient exclusion. |
| Document Type: | text |
| File Description: | application/pdf |
| Language: | English |
| Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.393.5123; http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/58/83/11/PDF/wp200707.pdf |
| Availability: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.393.5123; http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/58/83/11/PDF/wp200707.pdf |
| Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: | edsbas.AFE47145 |
| Database: | BASE |