| Title: |
CEO Age, Risk Incentives and Hedging Instrument Choice |
| Authors: |
Ettore Croci; Jel Code G |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA ANNUAL MEETINGS/2014-Rome/papers/EFMA2014_0318_fullpaper.pdf. |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: |
Key words; Vega; executive compensation; hedging; options; CEO age |
| Description: |
We analyze how firms hedge in the oil and gas industry. Our main finding is that CEO age determines hedging behavior. The probability of being a hedger as well as the use of linear hedging strategies decreases with CEO age. These results are consistent with an argument that financial distress, which sends a negative signal of managerial ability, is relatively more costly to younger CEOs. We also investigate the vega-theory of hedging instrument choice, finding some support for a negative relationship between vega and a) the use of derivatives and b) hedging strategies that include the sale of call options. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.638.4692 |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.638.4692; http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA ANNUAL MEETINGS/2014-Rome/papers/EFMA2014_0318_fullpaper.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.B34811 |
| Database: |
BASE |