| Title: |
A Multi-Unit Dominant Strategy Double Auction∗ |
| Authors: |
Simon Loertscher; Claudio Mezzetti; Jel-classification C |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://simonloertscher.net/data/downloads/12120/LM-DoubAuc270616.pdf. |
| Publication Year: |
2014 |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Subject Terms: |
Double-auctions; dominant strategy mechanisms; multi-units; VCG; no deficit |
| Description: |
This paper introduces a double auction in which buyers and sellers demanding and sup-plying multiple units of a homogeneous good have a dominant strategy to bid according to their true demands and supplies. Our double auction allocates quantity traded ef-ficiently, never runs a deficit and traders never regret participating; that is, ex-post individual rationality is satisfied. While one side of the market trades at a single price, the other side trades at VCG prices (with a reserve price). Using variants of the Ausubel auction, the dominant strategy outcome of our double auction can be implemented in dominant strategies in an open format. Our double auction converges to the efficient outcome at a rate 1/N as the number N of traders on the short side of the market goes to infinity. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.659.3037 |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.659.3037; http://simonloertscher.net/data/downloads/12120/LM-DoubAuc270616.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.BBE0F680 |
| Database: |
BASE |