| Title: |
Workforce Adjustment Costs and Employment |
| Authors: |
Giulio Piccirilli; Università Cattolica; Sacro Cuore; Jel-code J |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://www.aiel.it/bacheca/MODENA/PAPERS/Piccirilli.pdf. |
| Publication Year: |
2004 |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Description: |
We study a strategic interaction between a single monopoly union and a mass of competitive firms. Firms are subject to costly workforce adjustments and to changes in the economic environment in the form of a stochastic cycle between good and bad business conditions. The game is solved both under the assumption that the union can commit to a given wage sequence and under the assumption that such a commitment is not feasible. We find that the equilibrium under commitment and the one without commitment produce the same employment and wage outcome during a bad business spell. By contrast, the two equilibria exhibits in general different outcomes during a good business spell. However, when individual objective functions are linear and the union is utilitarian, the two equilibria are similar also in good times. Wearguethatthesefindings shed some light on the robustness of a corollary of the insider-outsider theory whereby the inability to commit is detrimental for the employment level in a world of high workforce replacement costs. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.201.5995; http://www.aiel.it/bacheca/MODENA/PAPERS/Piccirilli.pdf |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.201.5995; http://www.aiel.it/bacheca/MODENA/PAPERS/Piccirilli.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.BF9AB845 |
| Database: |
BASE |