| Title: |
Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from European Merger Cases |
| Authors: |
Ivaldi, Marc; Petit, Nicolas; Unekbas, Selçukhan |
| Contributors: |
Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R); Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole); Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE); European University Institute - Institut Universitaire Européen (EUI) |
| Source: |
ISSN: 0003-6056 ; Antitrust Law Journal ; https://hal.science/hal-05308625 ; Antitrust Law Journal, 2024, 86 (3), pp.647-695. ⟨10.2139/ssrn.4407333⟩ ; https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/resources/journal/issue-pdfs/. |
| Publisher Information: |
CCSD; American Bar Association |
| Publication Year: |
2024 |
| Collection: |
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique: ProdINRA |
| Subject Terms: |
Mergers and acquisitions; Nascent competitors; Innovation; Dynamic competition; Case study; Killer acquisitions; JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G34 - Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance; JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices; JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L8 - Industry Studies: Services/L.L8.L86 - Information and Internet Services • Computer Software; JEL: O - Economic Development; Technological Change; and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives; [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance |
| Description: |
National audience ; The killer acquisitions theory states that established firms buy new businesses to pre-empt future competition, particularly in the pharmaceutical and digital industries. The theory fuels demand to make merger policy more restrictive. But is the theory of killer acquisitions supported by empirical facts? Focusing on past investigations by the European Commission in information technology industries, this article studies whether acquisitions by large technology companies reduce competition by eliminating future rivalry. Despite the small sample size, the findings suggest that none of the reviewed transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation. |
| Document Type: |
article in journal/newspaper |
| Language: |
English |
| DOI: |
10.2139/ssrn.4407333 |
| Availability: |
https://hal.science/hal-05308625; https://hal.science/hal-05308625v1/document; https://hal.science/hal-05308625v1/file/wp_tse_1420.pdf; https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4407333 |
| Rights: |
https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.C558A6 |
| Database: |
BASE |