| Title: |
Auctions and Bid Rigging |
| Authors: |
McAfee, R. Preston; Williams, Michael; Hendricks, Kenneth |
| Source: |
The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2 ; page 498-522 ; ISBN 0199388598 9780199388592 9780199388622 |
| Publisher Information: |
Oxford University Press |
| Publication Year: |
2015 |
| Description: |
This chapter surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on bid rigging in auctions. In particular, it reviews the theory and practice of bidding rings in one-shot auctions and in repeated auctions. The main theme is how the type of auction, whether it is first-price or second-price, sealed bid or oral, affects the incentive of bidders to collude and the way in which they collude. |
| Document Type: |
book part |
| Language: |
English |
| ISBN: |
978-0-19-938859-2; 978-0-19-938862-2; 0-19-938859-8; 0-19-938862-8 |
| DOI: |
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199388592.013.0020 |
| Availability: |
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199388592.013.0020; https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34484/chapter/292568019 |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.CC581022 |
| Database: |
BASE |