| Title: |
Endogenous Market Structures and Antitrust Policy by |
| Authors: |
Federico Etro; Jel Code L; Martti Virtanen; Kresimir Zigic |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://www.intertic.org/Policy Papers/Crete.pdf. |
| Publication Year: |
2007 |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Description: |
We criticize the post-Chicago approach to antitrust showing that most of its re-sults change in the presence of endogenous market structures. The usual analysis of oligopolies with strategic interactions and an exogenous number of rms is extended to endogenous entry. The role of predatory strategies is evaluated within a generaliza-tion of the contestability theory to strategic interactions. Endogenous entry requires a revision of our understanding of the role of incumbents in pricing, producing in the presence of network externalities, bundling products, price discriminating and delegat-ing to retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is endogenous, leaders adopt aggressive strategies typically without exclusionary purposes and without reducing welfare. Endogenous entry has also implications for the analysis of mergers, that take place only if they create enough cost eciencies and do not harm consumers, and collusive cartels, that are unfeasible in markets where entry is endogenous. The spirit of the policy recommendations of the Chicago school is broadly supported by our analysis. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.563.7409; http://www.intertic.org/Policy Papers/Crete.pdf |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.563.7409; http://www.intertic.org/Policy Papers/Crete.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.E1E289D7 |
| Database: |
BASE |