| Title: |
Endogenous Market Structures and Antitrust Policy |
| Authors: |
Federico Etro; Jel Code L; David Ulph; Martti Virtanen; Kresimir Zigic |
| Contributors: |
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| Source: |
http://www.intertic.org/Policy Papers/JLaw%26Econ.pdf. |
| Collection: |
CiteSeerX |
| Description: |
I criticize the post-Chicago approach to antitrust showing that most of its game-theoretical conclusions collapse in the presence of endogenous market structures. The usual analysis of oligopolies with strategic interactions and an exogenous number of firms is extended to endogenous entry. The role of predatory strategies is evaluated within a generalization of the contestability theory to strategic interactions. Endoge-nous entry requires a wide revision of our understanding of the role of incumbents in pricing, producing in the presence of network externalities, bundling products, price discriminating and delegating to retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is endogenous, leaders adopt aggressive strategies without exclusionary purposes and without reducing welfare. Endogenous entry has also implications for the analysis of mergers, that take place only if create enough cost efficiencies and do not harm con-sumers, and collusive cartels, that are unfeasible in markets where entry is endogenous. The spirit of the policy recommendations of the Chicago school is broadly supported by our analysis in a solid game-theoretic framework. |
| Document Type: |
text |
| File Description: |
application/pdf |
| Language: |
English |
| Relation: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.561.6040; http://www.intertic.org/Policy Papers/JLaw%26Econ.pdf |
| Availability: |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.561.6040; http://www.intertic.org/Policy Papers/JLaw%26Econ.pdf |
| Rights: |
Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| Accession Number: |
edsbas.E2F9AC5 |
| Database: |
BASE |