| Title: |
Political economy of renewable resource federalism |
| Authors: |
Sanchirico, James N.; Blackwood, Julie C.; Fitzpatrick, Ben; Kling, David M.; Lenhart, Suzanne; Neubert, Michael G.; Shea, Katriona; Sims, Charles B.; Springborn, Michael R. |
| Publisher Information: |
Ecological Society of America 2021-02-17T20:31:27Z 2021-02-17T20:31:27Z 2020-12-15 |
| Document Type: |
Electronic Resource |
| Abstract: |
Author Posting. © Ecological Society of America, 2021. This article is posted here by permission of Ecological Society of America for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Ecological Applications 00 (2021): e2276, doi:10.1002/eap.2276.; The authority to manage natural capital often follows political boundaries rather than ecological. This mismatch can lead to unsustainable outcomes, as spillovers from one management area to the next may create adverse incentives for local decision making, even within a single country. At the same time, one‐size‐fits‐all approaches of federal (centralized) authority can fail to respond to state (decentralized) heterogeneity and can result in inefficient economic or detrimental ecological outcomes. Here we utilize a spatially explicit coupled natural–human system model of a fishery to illuminate trade‐offs posed by the choice between federal vs. state control of renewable resources. We solve for the dynamics of fishing effort and fish stocks that result from different approaches to federal management that vary in terms of flexibility. Adapting numerical methods from engineering, we also solve for the open‐loop Nash equilibrium characterizing state management outcomes, where each state anticipates and responds to the choices of the others. We consider traditional federalism questions (state vs. federal management) as well as more contemporary questions about the economic and ecological impacts of shifting regulatory authority from one level to another. The key mechanisms behind the trade‐offs include whether differences in local conditions are driven by biological or economic mechanisms; degree of flexibility embedded in the federal management; the spatial and temporal distribution of economic returns across states; and the status‐quo management type. While simple rules‐of‐thumb are elusive, our analysis reveals the complex political economy dimensions of renewable resource federalism.; This work was partially supported through the Ecological Federalism working group of the National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, an Institute sponsored by the National Science Foundation through NSF Award (No. DBI‐1300426), with additional support from the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy and The University of Tennessee, Knoxville. M. G. Neubert acknowledges support from the U.S. National Science Foundation (DEB‐1558904) and from the J. Seward Johnson Endowment in support of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution’s Marine Policy Center. We would like to thank seminar participants at Oregon State University, Nature Policy Lab at U.C. Davis, and the 2019 Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this research. |
| Index Terms: |
bioeconomics; metapopulation; Nash equilibrium; spillover; sustainability; Article |
| URL: |
https://hdl.handle.net/1912/26693; https://doi.org/10.1002/eap.2276; https://doi.org/10.1002/eap.2276 |
| Availability: |
Open access content. Open access content |
| Other Numbers: |
MBW oai:darchive.mblwhoilibrary.org:1912/26693; Sanchirico, J. N., Blackwood, J. C., Fitzpatrick, B., Kling, D. M., Lenhart, S., Neubert, M. G., Shea, K., Sims, C. B., & Springborn, M. R. (2021). Political economy of renewable resource federalism. Ecological Applications, e2276.; 10.1002/eap.2276; 1241556900 |
| Contributing Source: |
MARINE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY/WOODS HOLE; From OAIster®, provided by the OCLC Cooperative. |
| Accession Number: |
edsoai.on1241556900 |
| Database: |
OAIster |