A culture of corruption?

• List of Tables
• p. ix

• List of Figures
• p. xv

• Preface and Acknowledgements
• p. xvii

• 1.
• Coping with Government: Democratic Ideals and Street-Level Bureaucrats
• p. 1

• The Democratic Ideal: A 'Complete Democracy'
• p. 4

• Should Public-Sector Corruption Be Condemned?
• p. 8

• Does Street-Level Corruption Matter?
• p. 12

• Do History and Culture Exclude the Possibility of Reform?
• p. 17

• Why Surveys?
• p. 22

• What Surveys?
• p. 26

• Plan of the Book
• p. 28

• Appendix
• The Study Design
• p. 33

• Notes
• p. 35

• 2.
• Context: An Unfinished Transition
• p. 39

• The Democratisation of Local Government
• p. 40

• Privatisation and Restitution
• p. 41

• Economic and Moral Chaos
• p. 44

• The Political Context
• p. 48

• Public Perspectives on the Unfinished Transition
• p. 50

• Conclusion: Victims of a Necessary Transition
• p. 58

• Notes
• p. 58

• 3.
• Public Perceptions and Public Experience of Officials
• p. 61

• Public Perceptions of Politicians and Top Government Officials
• p. 62

• Public Perceptions of Street-Level Officials
• p. 66

• Public Perceptions of Comparative Corruption
• p. 70

• Public Perceptions of the Need to Use Contacts and Bribes
• p. 72

• Public Perceptions of Officials' Motives and Feelings
• p. 75

• Public Experience of Dealing with Officials
• p. 78

• Experience of Being Treated with Respect
• p. 79

• Experience of Favourable Treatment
• p. 80

• Experience of Fair (or Unfair) Treatment
• p. 82

• Experience of Extortion
• p. 83

• The Most Frequent or Most Annoying Problems When Dealing with Street-Level Officials
• p. 85

• Public Satisfaction with Street-Level Officials
• p. 88

• Conclusion: Extremely Negative Perceptions, Moderately Negative Experiences
• p. 91

• Notes
• p. 91

• 4.
• Citizen Strategies For Dealing With Officials
• p. 93

• How Citizens in Focus-Groups Discussed Strategies for Dealing With Officials
• p. 95

• Different Strategies for Different Objectives: Fair Treatment or Favours
• p. 102

• Different Strategies in Gossip and Personal Experience
• p. 103

• Public Perceptions of the Strategies Needed to Deal with Officials: Gossip and Hearsay
• p. 107

• Personal Experience of Using Different Strategies: Reported Behaviour
• p. 110

• Combinations of Strategies
• p. 114

• Influences on Citizens' Choice of Strategies
• p. 115

• All Strategies Correlate with Citizen Dissatisfaction
• p. 129

• Conclusion: Increased Argument, Not Bribery, Is the Main Response to Ill-Treatment
• p. 130

• Notes
• p. 132

• 5.
• Willing Givers?
• p. 133

• A Moral Imperative to Obey the Law?
• p. 134

• Public Condemnation of the Use of Contacts, Presents and Bribes
• p. 136

• A Permanent Part of Our Country's History and Culture?
• p. 140

• Would Citizens Give Bribes If Asked, or Accept Them If Offered?
• p. 145

• Feelings about Giving Bribes: Happy, Angry, Worried, or Ashamed?
• p. 147

• Public Experience of Actually Giving Presents and Bribes to Officials
• p. 149

• A Difference between Presents and Bribes? The Significance of Size, Timing and Motivation
• p. 149

• Did 'Values and Norms' Affect Behaviour?
• p. 157

• The Impact of Attempted Extortion
• p. 159

• The Independent Effects of Values and Extortion: A Regression Analysis
• p. 163

• Conclusion: Extortion Always Works, but Values Sometimes Moderate Its Impact
• p. 165

• Notes
• p. 166

• 6.
• 'Try Harder' or 'Give up': The Choice for Ethnic Minorities?
• p. 169

• A General Curvilinear Model of Response to Stress
• p. 171

• Eight Diverse Minorities
• p. 174

• Negative Attitudes towards Ethnic Minorities: Cross-Country and Cross-Minority Comparisons
• p. 181

• Suspicions of Ethnic Discrimination
• p. 184

• Actual Experience of Biased Treatment
• p. 186

• Comparative International Perspectives
• p. 190

• Ethnic Values and Norms
• p. 191

• Ethnic Behaviour
• p. 192

• The 'Ecological Effect': The Impact of Context
• p. 196

• Conclusion: Most Ethnic Minorities Are Located in the 'Try Harder' Zone, but Gypsies in the 'Give Up' Zone, and Turks on the Boundary
• p. 200

• Appendix
• The Ethnic Samples
• p. 203

• Notes
• p. 203

• 7.
• Street-Level Bureaucrats: Caught Between State and Citizen
• p. 205

• Officials 'As Citizens'--in Relation to Other Officials
• p. 207

• Officials 'As Employees'--in Relation to the State
• p. 210

• Officials 'As Officials'--in Relation to Their Clients
• p. 213

• How Did Their Experience 'As Employees' Affect Officials' Relationships with Clients?
• p. 224

• Conclusion: Benign and Pernicious Institutional Cultures
• p. 235

• Notes
• p. 238

• 8.
• Willing Takers?
• p. 239

• Temptations, Excuses and Justifications
• p. 241

• Doubts, Fears and Inhibitions
• p. 245

• Confessions
• p. 248

• Opportunity and Motivation
• p. 252

• Why Did Some Officials Accept while Others Did Not?
• p. 254

• A Causal Model
• p. 266

• Conclusion: Bargaining Power Rather Than Poverty Leads to Bribe Taking
• p. 275

• Notes
• p. 278

• 9.
• A Culture of Corruption? Support, Priorities and Prospects for Reform
• p. 279

• Is Reform Possible?
• p. 281

• Perceptions of Government Commitment to Reform
• p. 283

• Expert Opinion: Six Prescriptions
• p. 289

• Public Opinion on Reform--As Expressed in Focus-Group Discussions
• p. 299

• A Ten-Item Menu of Reform: Public Opinion and the Reactions of Street-Level Officials
• p. 304

• Priorities: The Single Most Effective Reform
• p. 305

• Reform Packages
• p. 308

• Resistance to Reform
• p. 312

• Alternative Ways of Encouraging Officials
• p. 315

• Downsizing the State
• p. 317

• Training and Guidance
• p. 320

• Reform Itself As the Problem?
• p. 322

• Public Support for International Pressure
• p. 322

• Why Do People Within the Same Country Have Different Views About Reform?
• p. 325

• Diagnosis and Prescription
• p. 333

• Analytic Perspectives: Focusing Reforms on Situations Rather Than Participants
• p. 335

• Could 'Glorious Summer' Follow the 'Winter of Discontent'?
• p. 340

• Notes
• p. 343

• Bibliography
• p. 347

• Index
• p. 359