Lending credibility
Titel: | Lending credibility : the International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transition |
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Verfasser: | |
Veröffentlicht: | Princeton, N.J [u.a.] : Princeton University Press, 2002 |
Umfang: | xxii, 286 p. |
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | Englisch |
ISBN: | 0691095280 ; 0691095299 |
- List of Figures
- p. x
- List of Tables
- p. xiii
- List of Acronyms
- p. xv
- Preface xix
- 1
- Introduction
- p. 1
- 1.1
- The Strategy of Transition: Inflation and Democracy
- p. 6
- 1.2
- What Would We Like the IMF to Do?
- p. 10
- I
- Models and Data
- p. 13
- 2
- A Formal Model of Lending Credibility
- p. 15
- 2.1
- The Model
- p. 21
- 2.2
- The Equilibrium
- p. 22
- 2.3
- Hypotheses Derived from the Formal Model
- p. 26
- 2.4
- Conclusions
- p. 27
- Appendix
- A Formal Model of Lending Credibility
- p. 29
- 3
- Studying IMF Effectiveness
- p. 39
- 3.1
- Previous Research
- p. 39
- 3.2
- Critiques Raised in the Literature
- p. 46
- 3.3
- New Critiques
- p. 48
- 3.4
- Research Design
- p. 49
- 3.5
- Conclusions
- p. 58
- 4
- An Empirical Test of the Model
- p. 59
- 4.1
- Models of IMF Lending Decisions
- p. 60
- 4.2
- Covariates of the Duration of Punishment Intervals
- p. 61
- 4.3
- Covariates of Program Suspensions
- p. 67
- 4.4
- Models of Policy Variables
- p. 73
- 4.5
- Conclusions
- p. 84
- II
- History
- p. 87
- 5
- Poland
- p. 89
- 5.1
- The Balcerowicz Plan
- p. 90
- 5.2
- The Extended Fund Facility
- p. 99
- 5.3
- The Second Stand-by Agreement
- p. 106
- 5.4
- Poland's Turn to the Left
- p. 109
- 5.5
- Conclusions
- p. 114
- 6
- Russia
- p. 116
- 6.1
- The Window of Opportunity Closes: 1992
- p. 118
- 6.2
- The First Stand-by Agreement, July 1992
- p. 120
- 6.3
- The Systemic Transformation Facility: May 1993
- p. 126
- 6.4
- The STF Renewal, April 1994
- p. 128
- 6.5
- The Second Stand-by Arrangement, April 1995
- p. 136
- 6.6
- The Extended Fund Facility, February, 1996
- p. 138
- 6.7
- The Third Stand-by, July 1998
- p. 153
- 6.8
- The Fourth Stand-by, July 1999
- p. 158
- 6.9
- Conclusions
- p. 164
- 7
- Ukraine
- p. 169
- 7.1
- From Hyperinflation to Market Reform, 1992-1994
- p. 170
- 7.2
- The Systemic Transformation Facility, 1994
- p. 177
- 7.3
- The First Stand-by, 1995
- p. 179
- 7.4
- The Second Stand-by, 1996
- p. 183
- 7.5
- The Third Stand-by, 1997
- p. 190
- 7.6
- The Extended Fund Facility, 1998
- p. 196
- 7.7
- Conclusions
- p. 207
- 8
- Bulgaria
- p. 209
- 8.1
- False Starts, 1990-1994
- p. 210
- 8.2
- The Origins of the Crisis, 1995-1996
- p. 217
- 8.3
- Consolidation under the Currency Board
- p. 227
- 8.4
- Conclusions
- p. 231
- 9
- Conclusion
- p. 233
- 9.1
- Research Design
- p. 234
- 9.2
- Policy Implications
- p. 239
- Appendixes
- p. 243
- A
- Data
- p. 245
- B
- Statistical Methods
- p. 250
- B.1
- Multiple Imputation
- p. 250
- B.2
- Duration Models
- p. 254
- C
- List of Interviews
- p. 262
- Bibliography
- p. 266
- Index
- p. 279