Lending credibility

Titel: Lending credibility : the International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transition
Verfasser:
Veröffentlicht: Princeton, N.J ˜[u.a.]œ : Princeton University Press, 2002
Umfang: xxii, 286 p.
Format: Buch
Sprache: Englisch
ISBN: 0691095280 ; 0691095299
  • List of Figures
  • p. x
  • List of Tables
  • p. xiii
  • List of Acronyms
  • p. xv
  • Preface xix
  • 1
  • Introduction
  • p. 1
  • 1.1
  • The Strategy of Transition: Inflation and Democracy
  • p. 6
  • 1.2
  • What Would We Like the IMF to Do?
  • p. 10
  • I
  • Models and Data
  • p. 13
  • 2
  • A Formal Model of Lending Credibility
  • p. 15
  • 2.1
  • The Model
  • p. 21
  • 2.2
  • The Equilibrium
  • p. 22
  • 2.3
  • Hypotheses Derived from the Formal Model
  • p. 26
  • 2.4
  • Conclusions
  • p. 27
  • Appendix
  • A Formal Model of Lending Credibility
  • p. 29
  • 3
  • Studying IMF Effectiveness
  • p. 39
  • 3.1
  • Previous Research
  • p. 39
  • 3.2
  • Critiques Raised in the Literature
  • p. 46
  • 3.3
  • New Critiques
  • p. 48
  • 3.4
  • Research Design
  • p. 49
  • 3.5
  • Conclusions
  • p. 58
  • 4
  • An Empirical Test of the Model
  • p. 59
  • 4.1
  • Models of IMF Lending Decisions
  • p. 60
  • 4.2
  • Covariates of the Duration of Punishment Intervals
  • p. 61
  • 4.3
  • Covariates of Program Suspensions
  • p. 67
  • 4.4
  • Models of Policy Variables
  • p. 73
  • 4.5
  • Conclusions
  • p. 84
  • II
  • History
  • p. 87
  • 5
  • Poland
  • p. 89
  • 5.1
  • The Balcerowicz Plan
  • p. 90
  • 5.2
  • The Extended Fund Facility
  • p. 99
  • 5.3
  • The Second Stand-by Agreement
  • p. 106
  • 5.4
  • Poland's Turn to the Left
  • p. 109
  • 5.5
  • Conclusions
  • p. 114
  • 6
  • Russia
  • p. 116
  • 6.1
  • The Window of Opportunity Closes: 1992
  • p. 118
  • 6.2
  • The First Stand-by Agreement, July 1992
  • p. 120
  • 6.3
  • The Systemic Transformation Facility: May 1993
  • p. 126
  • 6.4
  • The STF Renewal, April 1994
  • p. 128
  • 6.5
  • The Second Stand-by Arrangement, April 1995
  • p. 136
  • 6.6
  • The Extended Fund Facility, February, 1996
  • p. 138
  • 6.7
  • The Third Stand-by, July 1998
  • p. 153
  • 6.8
  • The Fourth Stand-by, July 1999
  • p. 158
  • 6.9
  • Conclusions
  • p. 164
  • 7
  • Ukraine
  • p. 169
  • 7.1
  • From Hyperinflation to Market Reform, 1992-1994
  • p. 170
  • 7.2
  • The Systemic Transformation Facility, 1994
  • p. 177
  • 7.3
  • The First Stand-by, 1995
  • p. 179
  • 7.4
  • The Second Stand-by, 1996
  • p. 183
  • 7.5
  • The Third Stand-by, 1997
  • p. 190
  • 7.6
  • The Extended Fund Facility, 1998
  • p. 196
  • 7.7
  • Conclusions
  • p. 207
  • 8
  • Bulgaria
  • p. 209
  • 8.1
  • False Starts, 1990-1994
  • p. 210
  • 8.2
  • The Origins of the Crisis, 1995-1996
  • p. 217
  • 8.3
  • Consolidation under the Currency Board
  • p. 227
  • 8.4
  • Conclusions
  • p. 231
  • 9
  • Conclusion
  • p. 233
  • 9.1
  • Research Design
  • p. 234
  • 9.2
  • Policy Implications
  • p. 239
  • Appendixes
  • p. 243
  • A
  • Data
  • p. 245
  • B
  • Statistical Methods
  • p. 250
  • B.1
  • Multiple Imputation
  • p. 250
  • B.2
  • Duration Models
  • p. 254
  • C
  • List of Interviews
  • p. 262
  • Bibliography
  • p. 266
  • Index
  • p. 279