Theories of truth

• Preface

• Projects of Theories of Truth

• 1.1
• Four-Dimensional Confusion

• 1.2
• How to Resolve This Confusion

• 1.3
• Extensionality

• 1.4
• Intensionality

• 1.5
• Natural Necessity

• 1.6
• Philosophical Analysis

• 1.7
• The Main Projects and Their Subdivisions

• 1.8
• Putting the Clues Together

• 1.9
• Projects and Programs

• 1.10
• Chapter Summary

• Justification and Truth Bearers

• 2.1
• The Epistemological Enterprise

• 2.2
• Truth, Justification, and Warranted Assertibility

• 2.3
• Confusion about Truth Bearers

• 2.4
• A Tolerant Attitude about Truth Bearers

• 2.5
• Sentence Tokens

• 2.6
• Truth versus Truth-in-L

• 2.7
• An Objection to the Concept of a Truth Bearer

• 2.8
• Chapter Summary

• Nonrealist Theories

• 3.1
• Realist and Nonrealist Theories of Truth

• 3.2
• Charles S. Peirce's Pragmaticism

• 3.3
• William James's Instrumentalism

• 3.4
• Truth and Value

• 3.5
• Brand Blanshard's Coherence Theory

• 3.6
• Skepticism and Nonrealist Theories

• 3.7
• A Regress Problem for All Nonrealist Theories

• 3.8
• Local Nonrealism

• 3.9
• Chapter Summary

• The Correspondence Theory

• 4.1
• Two Kinds of Correspondence

• 4.2
• Bertrand Russell's Theory of Correspondence as Congruence

• 4.3
• J. L. Austin's Theory of Correspondence as Correlation

• 4.4
• Some Technical Problems

• 4.5
• The Essence of the Correspondence Theory

• 4.6
• Nonrealist Correspondence Theories

• 4.7
• Objections to the Correspondence Theory

• 4.8
• Chapter Summary

• Alfred Tarski's Semantic Theory

• 5.1
• Tarski's Goals

• 5.2
• Tarski's Theory

• 5.3
• Recursion

• 5.4
• Satisfaction

• 5.5
• Names and Natural Languages

• 5.6
• Programs and Special Adequacy Conditions

• 5.7
• The Essence of Tarski's Notion of Truth

• 5.8
• Is the Semantic Theory a Correspondence Theory?

• 5.9
• Chapter Summary

• Objections to Tarski's Theory

• 6.1
• Objections to Tarski's Material Adequacy Condition

• 6.2
• The Semantic Theory and the Justification Project

• 6.3
• The Relativity Objection

• 6.4
• The Vacuity Objection

• 6.5
• Is Tarski Ontologically Neutral?

• 6.6
• Hartry Field and the Physicalist Program

• 6.7
• Neurath, Carnap, and the Origins of Modern Physicalism

• 6.8
• Objections to Physicalism

• 6.9
• Chapter Summary

• The Justification Project

• 7.1
• The Relation of Theories of Justification to Theories of Truth

• 7.2
• Foundationalism

• 7.3
• Instrumentalism as a Theory of Justification

• 7.4
• F. H. Bradley's Coherence Theory of Justification

• 7.5
• Chapter Summary

• Davidson and Dummett

• 8.1
• Davidson's Program

• 8.2
• Complications and Cautions

• 8.3
• Some Objections to the Davidson Program

• 8.4
• Dummett's Theory of Meaning

• 8.5
• Dummett's Argument against Construing Meaning as Truth Conditions

• 8.6
• A Critique of Dummett's Argument

• 8.7
• Truth-as-Justification and Skepticism Again

• 8.8
• Chapter Summary

• The Liar Paradox

• 9.1
• Damnable Lies

• 9.2
• Russell's Theory of Types

• 9.3
• The Object-Language/Metalanguage Distinction

• 9.4
• Criticisms of the Language-Levels Approach

• 9.5
• Saul Kripke's Theory of Truth-Value Gaps

• 9.6
• A. N. Prior's Solution

• 9.7
• Truth-Value Gluts

• 9.8
• Situational Semantics and the Liar Paradox

• 9.9
• Chapter Summary

• The Speech-Act Project and the Deflationary Thesis

• 10.1
• Strawson, Price, and the Illocutionary-Act Project

• 10.2
• The Assertion Project

• 10.3
• The Theory of Truth-as-Appraisal

• 10.4
• F. P. Ramsey's Redundancy Theory

• 10.5
• C. J. F. Williams's Redundancy Theory

• 10.6
• The Prosentential Theory of Truth

• 10.7
• The Deflationary Thesis

• 10.8
• Paul Horwich's Minimalist Answer to the Metaphysical Project

• 10.9
• Chapter Summary

• Notes

• References

• Index