Thinking it through

• Preface
• p. ix

• Introduction: A Few Preliminaries
• p. xiii

• Chapter 1
• Mind
• p. 1

• 1.1
• Introduction
• p. 1

• 1.2
• Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind
• p. 5

• 1.3
• The private-language argument
• p. 12

• 1.4
• Computers as models of the mind
• p. 19

• 1.5
• Why should there be a functionalist theory?
• p. 22

• 1.6
• Functionalism: A first problem
• p. 23

• 1.7
• A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain
• p. 25

• 1.8
• Ramsey's solution to the first problem
• p. 26

• 1.9
• Functionalism: A second problem
• p. 28

• 1.10
• M again
• p. 29

• 1.11
• Consciousness
• p. 31

• 1.12
• The puzzle of the physical
• p. 36

• 1.13
• Conclusion
• p. 37

• Chapter 2
• Knowledge
• p. 39

• 2.1
• Introduction
• p. 39

• 2.2
• Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief
• p. 41

• 2.3
• Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty
• p. 44

• 2.4
• Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain
• p. 53

• 2.5
• The foundations of knowledge
• p. 57

• 2.6
• Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism
• p. 61

• 2.7
• Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge
• p. 66

• 2.8
• Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification
• p. 70

• 2.9
• Epistemology naturalized
• p. 74

• 2.10
• Conclusion
• p. 77

• Chapter 3
• Language
• p. 79

• 3.1
• Introduction
• p. 79

• 3.2
• The linguistic turn
• p. 80

• 3.3
• The beetle in the box
• p. 84

• 3.4
• Frege's "sense" and "reference"
• p. 87

• 3.5
• Predicates and open sentences
• p. 92

• 3.6
• Problems of intensionality
• p. 96

• 3.7
• Truth conditions and possible worlds
• p. 99

• 3.8
• Analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent
• p. 102

• 3.9
• Natural language and logical form
• p. 106

• 3.10
• Using logic: Truth preservation, probability, and the lottery paradox
• p. 113

• 3.11
• Logical truth and logical properties
• p. 115

• 3.12
• Conventions of language
• p. 117

• 3.13
• The paradox of analysis
• p. 120

• 3.14
• Conclusion
• p. 124

• Chapter 4
• Science
• p. 127

• 4.1
• Introduction
• p. 127

• 4.2
• Description and prescription
• p. 129

• 4.3
• An example: Gregor Mendel's genetic theory
• p. 130

• 4.4
• Theory and observation
• p. 136

• 4.5
• The received view of theories
• p. 141

• 4.6
• The deductive-nomological model of explanation
• p. 145

• 4.7
• Theory reduction and instrumentalism
• p. 148

• 4.8
• Theory-ladenness
• p. 152

• 4.9
• Justifying theories I: The problem of induction
• p. 157

• 4.10
• Goodman's new riddle of induction
• p. 161

• 4.11
• Justifying theories II: Popper and falsification
• p. 163

• 4.12
• Justifying theories III: Inference to the best explanation
• p. 167

• 4.13
• Laws and causation
• p. 171

• 4.14
• Conclusion
• p. 174

• Chapter 5
• Morality
• p. 177

• 5.1
• Introduction
• p. 177

• 5.2
• Facts and values
• p. 180

• 5.3
• Realism and emotivism
• p. 183

• 5.4
• Intuitionism
• p. 187

• 5.5
• Emotivism again
• p. 191

• 5.6
• Kant's universalizability principle
• p. 197

• 5.7
• Dealing with relativism
• p. 201

• 5.8
• Prescriptivism and supervenience
• p. 204

• 5.9
• Problems of utilitarianism I: Defining "utility"
• p. 205

• 5.10
• Problems of utilitarianism II: Consequentialism versus absolutism
• p. 208

• 5.11
• Rights
• p. 213

• 5.12
• Self and others
• p. 215

• 5.13
• Conclusion
• p. 217

• Chapter 6
• Politics
• p. 221

• 6.1
• Introduction
• p. 221

• 6.2
• Hobbes: Escaping the state of nature
• p. 224

• 6.3
• Problems for Hobbes
• p. 229

• 6.4
• Game theory I: Two-person zero-sum games
• p. 232

• 6.5
• Game theory II: The prisoners' dilemma
• p. 242

• 6.6
• The limits of prudence
• p. 245

• 6.7
• Rawls's theory of justice
• p. 248

• 6.8
• The difference principle and inequality surpluses
• p. 250

• 6.9
• Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument
• p. 252

• 6.10
• Criticizing Rawls II: Why maximin?
• p. 254

• 6.11
• Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles
• p. 256

• 6.12
• Reflective equilibrium
• p. 258

• 6.13
• Are the two principles right?
• p. 260

• 6.14
• Nozick: Beginning with rights
• p. 261

• 6.15
• The entitlement theory
• p. 265

• 6.16
• Ethics and politics
• p. 267

• 6.17
• Conclusion
• p. 269

• Chapter 7
• Law
• p. 271

• 7.1
• Introduction
• p. 271

• 7.2
• Defining "law" I: Positivism and natural law
• p. 275

• 7.3
• Defining "law" II: Legal systems and the variety of laws
• p. 278

• 7.4
• Hart: The elements of a legal system
• p. 280

• 7.5
• Punishment: The problem
• p. 285

• 7.6
• Justifying punishment: Deterrence
• p. 286

• 7.7
• Retributivism: Kant's objections
• p. 288

• 7.8
• Combining deterrence and retribution
• p. 289

• 7.9
• Deterrence theory again
• p. 291

• 7.10
• Why do definitions matter?
• p. 293

• 7.11
• Conclusion
• p. 296

• Chapter 8
• Metaphysics
• p. 299

• 8.1
• Introduction
• p. 299

• 8.2
• An example: The existence of numbers
• p. 300

• 8.3
• "God" as a proper name
• p. 305

• 8.4
• The necessary being
• p. 310

• 8.5
• Hume: No a priori proofs of matters of fact
• p. 316

• 8.6
• Kant: "Existence" is not a predicate
• p. 317

• 8.7
• A posteriori arguments
• p. 322

• 8.8
• The argument from design
• p. 324

• 8.9
• The harmony of nature
• p. 325

• 8.10
• The necessity of a creative intelligence
• p. 329

• 8.11
• Hume's argument from design: The argument from experience
• p. 331

• 8.12
• The problem of evil and inference to the best explanation
• p. 334

• 8.13
• Conclusion
• p. 337

• Chapter 9
• Philosophy
• p. 339

• 9.1
• Introduction
• p. 339

• 9.2
• Traditional thought
• p. 341

• 9.3
• Arguing with the Azande
• p. 344

• 9.4
• The significance of literacy
• p. 349

• 9.5
• Cognitive relativism
• p. 353

• 9.6
• The argument against strong relativism
• p. 355

• 9.7
• The argument for weak relativism
• p. 357

• 9.8
• Philosophy and religion
• p. 360

• 9.9
• Philosophy and science
• p. 364

• 9.10
• An example: Free will and determinism
• p. 365

• 9.11
• Compatibilism and moral responsibility
• p. 373

• 9.12
• The special character of philosophy
• p. 377

• 9.13
• Conclusion
• p. 379

• Notes
• p. 381

• Index
• p. 393