Warranted Christian belief

• Part I.
• Is There A Question?

• 1.
• Kant
• p. 3

• I.
• The Problem

• II.
• Kant

• A.
• Two Worlds or One?

• B.
• Arguments or Reasons?

• 2.
• Kaufman and Hick
• p. 31

• I.
• Kaufman

• A.
• The Real Referent and the Available Referent

• B.
• The Function of Religious Language

• II.
• Hick

• A.
• The Real

• B.
• Coherent?

• C.
• Religiously Relevant?

• D.
• Is There Such a Thing?

• Part II.
• What is the Question?

• 3.
• Justification and the Classical Picture
• p. 67

• I.
• John Locke

• A.
• Living by Reason

• B.
• Revelation

• II.
• Classical Evidentialism, Deontologism, and Foundationalism

• A.
• Classical Foundationalism

• B.
• Classical Deontologism

• III.
• Back to the Present

• IV.
• Problems with the Classical Picture

• A.
• Self-Referential Problems

• B.
• Most of Our Beliefs Unjustified?

• V.
• Christian Belief Justified

• VI.
• Analogical Variations

• A.
• Variations on Classical Foundationalism

• B.
• Variations on the Deontology

• C.
• Is This the de Jure Question?

• 4.
• Rationality
• p. 108

• I.
• Some Assorted Versions of Rationality

• A.
• Aristotelian Rationality

• B.
• Rationality as Proper Function

• C.
• The Deliverances of Reason

• D.
• Means-End Rationality

• II.
• Alstonian Practical Rationality

• A.
• The Initial Question

• B.
• Doxastic Practices

• C.
• Epistemic Circularity

• D.
• The Argument for Practical Rationality

• E.
• Practical Rationality Initially Characterized

• F.
• The Original Position

• G.
• The Wide Original Position

• H.
• A Narrow Original Position?

• 5.
• Warrant and the Freud-and-Marx Complaint
• p. 135

• I.
• The FandM Complaint

• A.
• Freud

• B.
• Marx

• C.
• Others

• D.
• How Shall We Understand the FandM Complaint?

• II.
• Warrant: The Sober Truth

• III.
• The FandM Complaint Again

• Part III.
• Warranted Christian Belief

• 6.
• Warranted Belief in God
• p. 167

• I.
• The Aquinas/Calvin Model

• A.
• Models

• B.
• Presentation of the Model

• II.
• Is Belief in God Warrant-Basic?

• A.
• If False, Probably Not

• B.
• If True, Probably So

• III.
• The de Jure Question Is Not Independent of the de Facto Question

• IV.
• The FandM Complaint Revisited

• 7.
• Sin and Its Cognitive Consequences
• p. 199

• I.
• Preliminaries

• II.
• Initial Statement of the Extended Model

• III.
• The Nature of Sin

• IV.
• The Noetic Effects of Sin

• A.
• The Basic Consequence

• B.
• Sin and Knowledge

• 8.
• The Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model: Revealed to Our Minds
• p. 241

• I.
• Faith

• II.
• How Does Faith Work?

• III.
• Faith and Positive Epistemic Status

• IV.
• Proper Basicality and the Role of Scripture

• V.
• Comparison with Locke

• VI.
• Why Necessary?

• VII.
• Cognitive Renewal

• 9.
• The Testimonial Model: Sealed upon Our Hearts
• p. 290

• I.
• Belief and Affection

• II.
• Jonathan Edwards

• A.
• Intellect and Will: Which is Prior?

• B.
• The Affirmations of Faith

• III.
• Analogue of Warrant

• IV.
• Eros

• 10.
• Objections
• p. 324

• I.
• Warrant and the Argument from Religious Experience

• II.
• What Can Experience Show?

• III.
• A Killer Argument?

• IV.
• Son of Great Pumpkin?

• V.
• Circularity?

• Part IV.
• Defeaters?

• 11.
• Defeaters and Defeat
• p. 357

• I.
• Nature of Defeaters

• II.
• Defeaters for Christian or Theistic Belief

• III.
• Projective Theories a Defeater for Christian Belief?

• 12.
• Two (or More) Kinds of Scripture Scholarship
• p. 374

• I.
• Scripture Divinely Inspired

• II.
• Traditional Christian Biblical Commentary

• III.
• Historical Biblical Criticism

• A.
• Varieties of Historical Biblical Criticism

• B.
• Tensions with Traditional Christianity

• IV.
• Why Aren't Most Christians More Concerned?

• A.
• Force Majeure

• B.
• A Moral Imperative?

• C.
• Historical Biblical Criticism More Inclusive?

• V.
• Nothing to Be Concerned About

• A.
• Troeltschian Historical Biblical Criticism Again

• B.
• Non-Troeltschian Historical Biblical Criticism

• C.
• Conditionalization

• VI.
• Concluding Coda

• 13.
• Postmodernism and Pluralism
• p. 422

• I.
• Postmodernism

• A.
• Is Postmodernism Inconsistent with Christian Belief?

• B.
• Do These Claims Defeat Christian Belief?

• C.
• Postmodernism a Failure of Nerve

• II.
• Pluralism

• A.
• A Probabilistic Defeater?

• B.
• The Charge of Moral Arbitrariness

• 14.
• Suffering and Evil
• p. 458

• I.
• Evidential Atheological Arguments

• A.
• Rowe's Arguments

• B.
• Draper's Argument

• II.
• Nonargumentative Defeaters?

• Index
• p. 500