Ten problems of consciousness
Titel: | Ten problems of consciousness : a representational theory of the phenomenal mind / Michael Tye |
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Verfasser: | |
Veröffentlicht: | Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : MIT Press, 1995 |
Umfang: | XVI, 248 S. |
Format: | E-Book |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk: |
Representation and mind A Bradford book |
RVK-Notation: |
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Vorliegende Ausgabe: | Online-Ausg.: 1999. - Online-Ressource. |
ISBN: | 0585023549 (Sekundärausgabe) ; 9780585023540 (Sekundärausgabe) |
Hinweise zum Inhalt: |
Inhaltsbeschreibung der Sammlung und Zugangshinweise
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- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1
- The Ten Problems
- 1.1
- Phenomenal Consciousness Introduced
- 1.2
- The Problem of Ownership
- 1.3
- The Problem of Perspectival Subjectivity
- 1.4
- The Problem of Mechanism
- 1.5
- The Problem of Phenomenal Causation
- 1.6
- The Problem of Super Blindsight
- 1.7
- The Problem of Duplicates
- 1.8
- The Problem of the Inverted Spectrum
- 1.9
- The Problem of Transparency
- 1.10
- The Problem of Felt Location and Phenomenal Vocabulary
- 1.11
- The Problem of the Alien Limb
- 2
- Why the Problems Run So Deep
- 2.1
- Must the Physical Be Objective?
- 2.2
- Perspectival Subjectivity and the Explanatory Gap
- 2.3
- Physicalism and Phenomenal Causation
- 2.4
- On the Denial of Perspectival Subjectivity
- 2.5
- The Paradox of Phenomenal Consciousness
- 2.6
- The Available Strategies
- 2.7
- The Way Ahead II
- 3
- Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains?
- 3.1
- The Repudiation of Phenomenal Objects
- 3.2
- Publicizing the Phenomenal: Split Brains
- 3.3
- Phenomenal Objects as Events
- 3.4
- A Closer Look at Events
- 4
- The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences
- 4.1
- Intentional States and Intentional Content
- 4.2
- How Perceptual Sensations Represent
- 4.3
- Afterimages
- 4.4
- The Problem of Ownership Revisited
- 4.5
- Pains
- 4.6
- Other Bodily Sensations
- 4.7
- The Format of Sensory Representations
- 4.8
- Background Feelings
- 4.9
- Emotions
- 4.10
- Moods
- 5
- What What It's Like Is Really Like
- 5.1
- Why Be an Intentionalist?
- 5.2
- Phenomenal Content: The PANIC Theory
- 5.3
- Colors and Other ''Secondary Qualities"
- 5.4
- Can Duplicate Brains Differ Phenomenally?
- 5.5
- Some Putative Counterexamples
- 6
- The Tale of Mary and Mechanism: A Theory of Perspectival Subjectivity
- 6.1
- The Real Nature of the Phenomenal
- 6.2
- Perspectival Subjectivity and the Paradox
- 6.3
- Mary's Room
- 6.4
- Some of Mary's Philosophical Relatives
- 6.5
- The Explanatory Gap
- 7
- Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can?
- 7.1
- The Status of the PANIC Theory
- 7.2
- Imaginability and Perception: A Parallel
- 7.3
- Troublesome Possibilities?
- 7.4
- Zombie Replicas and Other Duplicates
- 7.5
- Inverted Experiences
- 7.6
- Inverted Earth
- Appendix: Blindsight
- A.1
- Three Sorts of Visual Agnosia
- A.2
- An Empirical Proposal
- Notes
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index