Ten problems of consciousness

Titel: Ten problems of consciousness : a representational theory of the phenomenal mind / Michael Tye
Verfasser:
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. ˜[u.a.]œ : MIT Press, 1995
Umfang: XVI, 248 S.
Format: E-Book
Sprache: Englisch
Schriftenreihe/
mehrbändiges Werk:
Representation and mind
A Bradford book
RVK-Notation:
Schlagworte:
Vorliegende Ausgabe: Online-Ausg.: 1999. - Online-Ressource.
ISBN: 0585023549 (Sekundärausgabe) ; 9780585023540 (Sekundärausgabe)
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • 1
  • The Ten Problems
  • 1.1
  • Phenomenal Consciousness Introduced
  • 1.2
  • The Problem of Ownership
  • 1.3
  • The Problem of Perspectival Subjectivity
  • 1.4
  • The Problem of Mechanism
  • 1.5
  • The Problem of Phenomenal Causation
  • 1.6
  • The Problem of Super Blindsight
  • 1.7
  • The Problem of Duplicates
  • 1.8
  • The Problem of the Inverted Spectrum
  • 1.9
  • The Problem of Transparency
  • 1.10
  • The Problem of Felt Location and Phenomenal Vocabulary
  • 1.11
  • The Problem of the Alien Limb
  • 2
  • Why the Problems Run So Deep
  • 2.1
  • Must the Physical Be Objective?
  • 2.2
  • Perspectival Subjectivity and the Explanatory Gap
  • 2.3
  • Physicalism and Phenomenal Causation
  • 2.4
  • On the Denial of Perspectival Subjectivity
  • 2.5
  • The Paradox of Phenomenal Consciousness
  • 2.6
  • The Available Strategies
  • 2.7
  • The Way Ahead II
  • 3
  • Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains?
  • 3.1
  • The Repudiation of Phenomenal Objects
  • 3.2
  • Publicizing the Phenomenal: Split Brains
  • 3.3
  • Phenomenal Objects as Events
  • 3.4
  • A Closer Look at Events
  • 4
  • The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences
  • 4.1
  • Intentional States and Intentional Content
  • 4.2
  • How Perceptual Sensations Represent
  • 4.3
  • Afterimages
  • 4.4
  • The Problem of Ownership Revisited
  • 4.5
  • Pains
  • 4.6
  • Other Bodily Sensations
  • 4.7
  • The Format of Sensory Representations
  • 4.8
  • Background Feelings
  • 4.9
  • Emotions
  • 4.10
  • Moods
  • 5
  • What What It's Like Is Really Like
  • 5.1
  • Why Be an Intentionalist?
  • 5.2
  • Phenomenal Content: The PANIC Theory
  • 5.3
  • Colors and Other ''Secondary Qualities"
  • 5.4
  • Can Duplicate Brains Differ Phenomenally?
  • 5.5
  • Some Putative Counterexamples
  • 6
  • The Tale of Mary and Mechanism: A Theory of Perspectival Subjectivity
  • 6.1
  • The Real Nature of the Phenomenal
  • 6.2
  • Perspectival Subjectivity and the Paradox
  • 6.3
  • Mary's Room
  • 6.4
  • Some of Mary's Philosophical Relatives
  • 6.5
  • The Explanatory Gap
  • 7
  • Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can?
  • 7.1
  • The Status of the PANIC Theory
  • 7.2
  • Imaginability and Perception: A Parallel
  • 7.3
  • Troublesome Possibilities?
  • 7.4
  • Zombie Replicas and Other Duplicates
  • 7.5
  • Inverted Experiences
  • 7.6
  • Inverted Earth
  • Appendix: Blindsight
  • A.1
  • Three Sorts of Visual Agnosia
  • A.2
  • An Empirical Proposal
  • Notes
  • References
  • Name Index
  • Subject Index