France's war in Mali

Titel: France's war in Mali : lessons for an expeditionary army / Michael Shurkin
Verfasser:
Körperschaft:
Veröffentlicht: Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND Corporation, 2014
Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 51 Seiten) : color Illustrationen, color Karten
Format: E-Book
Sprache: Englisch
Schriftenreihe/
mehrbändiges Werk:
RAND Corporation research report series ; ; RR770
ISBN: 9780833089502 ; 0833089501
alg: 42432799
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