Policy Matters But How? Explaining Non-Compliance Dynamics in the EU
| Titel: | Policy Matters But How? Explaining Non-Compliance Dynamics in the EU |
|---|---|
| Verfasser: | ; ; |
| Körperschaft: | |
| Veröffentlicht: | Berlin, 2011 |
| Umfang: | Online-Ressource, 35 S. |
| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk: |
KFG Working Paper Series ; Bd. 24 |
X
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