Political institutions and income inequality: the case of decentralization
| Titel: | Political institutions and income inequality: the case of decentralization |
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| Verfasser: | |
| Körperschaft: | |
| Veröffentlicht: | Berlin, 2003 |
| Umfang: | Online-Ressource, 47 S. |
| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk: |
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsgruppe Institutionen, Staaten, Märkte ; Bd. 2003-09 |
| Andere Ausgaben: |
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe: Beramendi, Pablo, 1971-. Political institutions and income inequality. - Berlin : WZB, 2003. - 53 S., graph. Darst.
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| Bemerkung: | Veröffentlichungsversion |
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| Zusammenfassung: |
Abstract: "Political power is being reallocated across territorial boundaries. Traditionally centralized polities are either decentralized or on their way to decentralization. In addition, European nations are engaged in the process of building a common set of rules both respectful to and compatible with their own peculiarities. As a result, the number of political entities in which several levels of government share a common economic space has increased. This paper analyzes how decentralization interacts with the politics of redistribution and inequality. The argument can be outlined as follows. Contrary to what is conventionally argued, decentralization per se does not necessarily lead towards higher (or lower) levels of income inequality. Whatever the impact of decentralization on the distribution of income may be, it is to a large extent a function of the internal structures of inequality within regions and their combination. Secondly, if decentralization indeed leads to different distri |
