How to circumvent parochial interests without excluding stake-holders: the rationalizing power of functionally differentiated decision-making

Titel: How to circumvent parochial interests without excluding stake-holders: the rationalizing power of functionally differentiated decision-making
Verfasser:
Körperschaft:
Veröffentlicht: Bamberg, 2004
Umfang: Online-Ressource, 48 S.
Format: E-Book
Sprache: Englisch
Schriftenreihe/
mehrbändiges Werk:
BACES Discussion Paper ; Bd. 3
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