Russia's war in Ukraine

• Foreword
• 15

• I
• The Russia-Ukraine War in Germany
• 31

• I.1
• February 24,2022: Ukraine's Fateful Day
• 31

• 1.2
• Putin's "Special Military Operation" against Ukraine: A War of Annihilation
• 32

• I.2.1
• Cultural Genocide
• 32

• I.2.2
• Putin's Declaration of War of February 24, 2022
• 34

• I.2.3
• Why Now?
• 36

• I.2.4
• Putin's Misjudgments
• 39

• I.3
• Ukraine: No Choice between "War and Peace"
• 42

• I.3.1
• Putin's "Final Solution" to the "Ukrainian question"
• 42

• I.3.2
• Consequences of a Russian Victory
• 43

• I.4
• Western Support for Ukraine's Defense
• 44

• I.4.1
• Until February 24, 2022: "Appeasement" as in Munich, 1938
• 44

• I.4.2
• "Collective Self-Defense"
• 47

• I.4.3
• How Far Is the West Prepared to Go? - The "War Goal" of the Supporters of Ukraine
• 49

• I.4.4
• Western Ambiguity on the "Crimea Question"
• 50

• I.4.5
• "War Goal": Incompatibility between the Western and Ukrainian Definitions?
• 52

• I.4.6
• The "Incrementalism" of German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz
• 53

• I.5
• German Appeals for Surrender
• 56

• I.5.1
• The Russian Attack on Ukraine: "Blame the West"
• 56

• I.5.2
• "Neutralization" of Ukraine
• 57

• I.5.3
• "Compromise!" - "Emma's" Letter to the Chancellor
• 58

• I.5.4
• Philosophical Support for the German Defeatists
• 61

• I.5.5
• Eastern Europe Ignoramuses: "Ceasefire Now!"
• 63

• I.5.6
• Eastern Europe Experts: "Heavy Weapons - Now!"
• 66

• I.5.7
• "Capable of Peace in Times of War": The Expert Opinion of German Peace Researchers
• 68

• I.5.8
• Alice Schwarzer and Sahra Wagenknecht's "Manifesto for Peace": A Manifestation of Useful Idiocy
• 69

• I.5.9
• The "Other Cheek" of Christian Pacifist Margot Käßmann
• 76

• I.5.10
• Graf von Sponeck: "Only Talks Save Human Lives" - The Height of Delusion
• 78

• I.5.11
• "Not Accepting the Monstrosity!"
• 78

• I.5.12
• The SPD-Pensioners' Letter to the Chancellor: "Create Peace! Ceasefire and Common Security Now!"
• 80

• I.6
• Excursus: The Ukraine War in America
• 83

• I.6.1
• US-American "Putin-Understanders"
• 83

• I.6.2
• President Biden's Initial Hesitancy: Placation of American Concerns
• 86

• I.6.3
• Divided US Administration?
• 89

• I.6.4
• US President Joe Biden: Firmly by Ukraine's Side
• 95

• I.6.5
• The "White House": Three Reasons for America's Help in the Ukrainian "War of Independence"
• 98

• I.7
• Negotiations with Putin: A Foolish Hope
• 99

• I.7.1
• "Peace against Land": Extraditing Part of the Ukrainian Population to the Enemy
• 99

• I.7.2
• China's Position Paper of February 20, 2023
• 102

• I.8
• Nuclear Escalation: The "German Angst"
• 104

• I.8.1
• Putin's Threat of Nuclear Escalation: Deterrence or Blackmail?
• 104

• I.8.2
• "Verdun": Putin's War of Attrition
• 106

• I.8.3
• The West's Strategic War Goal: Russia's Defeat in Ukraine
• 108

• I.8.4
• Putin's Fluid Red Lines: Western Perception
• 109

• I.8.5
• "Tactical" Nuclear Weapons: Psychological Warfare
• 113

• I.9
• Conclusion: Defense of Europe through Military Support for Ukraine
• 117

• II
• "Putler": Putin and Hitler in Comparison
• 121

• Preliminary Remark: Putin and Hitler - "Striking Parallels" (H. A. Winkler)
• 121

• II.1
• Putin and Hitler: War
• 121

• II.1.1
• Putin's War of Aggression
• 121

• II.1.2
• The Aggressors' Declarations of War
• 123

• II.1.3
• Hitler and Putin: Commanders-in-Chief and Supreme War Criminals
• 125

• II.2
• "Putinism": Russian Fascism
• 127

• II.2.1
• Fascism: An Errant Term
• 127

• II.2.2
• "Rushism": Russian Fascism
• 128

• II.2.3
• Is Putin's Russia Really Fascist?
• 133

• II.2.4
• The Ideological "Superstructure" of Putinism
• 136

• II.2.5
• Historical and Contemporary, Russian and European Thought Leaders
• 137

• II.2.6
• "Russkii Mir" - the "Russian World"
• 147

• II.2.7
• The Russian Orthodox Church: Putin's Spiritual Army
• 148

• II.3
• Hitler's Germany - Putin's Russia: "Revisionist Powers"
• 149

• II.3.1
• The "Stab in the Back" Legend ("Dolchstoß-legende"): Betrayal on the Home Front
• 149

• II.3.2
• Russia's "Versailles Syndrome"
• 150

• II.3.3
• Dealing with Revisionist Powers
• 153

• II.3.4
• Ethnic Nationalism and Multinational Reality
• 154

• II.3.5
• "Politics of History" - Hitler and Putin: Teacher and Pupil
• 155

• II.3.6
• NSDAP and "United Russia": Movement Party and State Party
• 157

• II.3.7
• Russia's "De-Putinization" after the War
• 157

• II.4
• Putin: Hitler's "Revenant"
• 160

• II.4.1
• Racism and Biologism
• 161

• II.4.2
• Hitler's and Putin's "Genocidal Language"
• 162

• II.4.3
• "Fate" and "Providence"
• 165

• II.4.4
• Putin's "True Nature"
• 167

• II.4.5
• "Appeasement": Then and Now
• 169

• II.4.6
• Hitler's Suicide - "Imitatio" of the "Revenant"?
• 170

• III
• "Nuremberg II": An International Tribunal for the Trial of Russian "Major War Criminals"
• 173

• III.1
• "Nuremberg I": The Trial of the German "Major War Criminals"
• 173

• III.1.1
• The Statute of the International Military Tribunal
• 173

• III.1.2
• The Four "Core Crimes" of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
• 175

• III.2
• Russia's Four "Core Crimes" under International Law
• 181

• III.2.1
• Russia's Crime of Aggression
• 181

• III.2.2
• Russian War Crimes in Ukraine: Possibilities of International Prosecution
• 184

• III.2.3
• Russian Genocide in Ukraine
• 188

• III.2.4
• Russia's Crimes against Humanity
• 195

• III.2.5
• International Criminal Court Arrest Warrant against Putin
• 198

• III.3
• A "Nuremberg II" for the Sentencing Russian "Major War Criminals"
• 201

• III.3.1
• The Emergency Decision of the International Court of Justice of March 16, 2022
• 202

• III.3.2
• The European Court of Human Rights: Closing All Cases against Russia
• 207

• III.3.3
• The International Criminal Court
• 209

• III.3.4
• Limitations of the ICC in Prosecuting the Russian Crime of Aggression
• 213

• III.4
• A New International Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Prosecution of Russia's Crime of Aggression
• 215

• III.4.1
• The "Gap in the Architecture of International Law" (Philippe Sands)
• 215

• III.4.2
• The Legal Opinion of the European Parliament
• 217

• III.4.3
• The Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of January 26, 2023
• 218

• III.4.4
• The Ukrainian Proposal of a "Special Tribunal"
• 222

• III.4.5
• The Two-Stage Model of the German International Law Expert Claus Kreß
• 223

• III.5
• The UN "Uniting for Peace" Mechanism
• 225

• III.5.1
• The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution 377 A (V) of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950
• 225

• III.5.2
• "Uniting for Peace" Resolution Revival in 2022
• 225

• III.5.3
• The 11th Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
• 226

• III.5.4
• The Assembly Resolution ES-11/1
• 227

• III.5.5
• Further Emergency Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly on the Russian Aggression
• 228

• III.5.6
• The Limited Powers of the United Nations General Assembly
• 231

• III.5.7
• The UN Resolution "Uniting for Peace": An Assembly Mandate for "Enforcement Action"?
• 233

• III.6
• Punishing the "Main Culprit": Putin
• 237

• III.6.1
• Putin: Supreme Commander and Supreme War Criminal
• 238

• III.6.2
• Putin on Trial?
• 239

• III.6.3
• "Functional Immunity"
• 240

• III.6.4
• Extradition of Putin and Waiver of Punishment for His "Entourage": A Chance for a Coup against Putin?
• 242

• III.6.5
• The "Case of Putin": An Extra-Legal Solution?
• 243

• Annexes
• 245

• Appeals and Open Letters
• 245

• Emma's Open Letter to Chancellor Scholz
• 245

• Jürgen Habermas: War and Indignation. A Plea for Negotiations
• 248

• Ceasefire - Now!
• 257

• Heavy Weapons - Now!
• 260

• "Manifesto for Peace"
• 268

• "Jesus Was Not a Revolutionary with a Gun in Hand"
• 271

• Appeal-Do Not Accept the Outrageous!
• 275

• Making Peace: Ceasefire, Negotiations and Common Security
• 278

• Opinion Polls on Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine
• 286

• 1
• Ukraine Analysen: List of Surveys on the Ukraine War (Germany)
• 286

• 2
• Norddeutscher Rundfunk (North German Broadcasting)/NDR
• 287

• 3
• Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (Central German Broadcasting)/MDR
• 288

• 4
• MDR Short Survey on the Delivery of Main Battle Tanks (Leopard 2) to Ukraine
• 290

• 5
• MDR Saxony
• 291

• 6
• Survey by the Opinion Research Institute YouGov on Behalf of the German Press Agency
• 291

• 7
• Survey by the Online Survey Institute Civey on Behalf of Magazine Der Spiegel
• 292

• 8
• Survey As Part of the "ARD Germany Trend" in March 2023
• 293

• 9
• Survey of the ZDF Political Barometer in February 2023 by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
• 294