Nash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox

Titel:	Nash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox / Suchan Chae, Paul Heidhues
Verfasser:	Chae, Suchan ; Heidhues, Paul
Veröffentlicht:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2001
Umfang:	1 Online-Ressource
Format:	E-Book
Sprache:	Englisch
Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk:	WZB Discussion Paper ; FS IV 01-15
Schlagworte:	Verhandlungstheorie Koalitionstheorie Nash-Gleichgewicht Präferenzfunktion Präferenzordnung Wahlhandlungstheorie Theorie

alg: 53037334
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010@    $aeng 
011@    $a2001 $n2001 
021A    $aNash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox $hSuchan Chae, Paul Heidhues 
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044K    $qDNB $74164336-7 $8Koalitionstheorie [Ts1] $9085732273 
044K    $qDNB $RGleichgewicht $RSpieltheorie $RKoordinationsspiel $#Nash-Gleichgewicht $74171190-7 $8Nash-Gleichgewicht [Ts1] $9085787213 
044K    $qDNB $RPräferenzrelation $#Präferenzsystem Entscheidungstheorie $#Präferenzordnung Entscheidungstheorie $74277606-5 $8Präferenzfunktion [Ts1] $9086493957 
044K    $qDNB $#Präferenzordnung $#Präferenzstruktur $74277605-3 $8Präferenzordnung [Ts1] $9086493949 
044K    $qDNB $RHaushaltstheorie $#Theorie der Wahlakte $74382455-9 $8Wahlhandlungstheorie [Ts1] $9088410293 
044K    $qDNB $RPraxis $#Theory (Philosophy) $#Théorie (philosophie) $#Theorie $#Theorie $74059787-8 $8Theorie [Tsz] $9085166316 
045E    $c330 $c380 $c650 $c670 $c320 
046X    $aArchivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet $5DE-101 

lok: 53037334 3

exp: 53037334 3 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.030 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808622 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 5

exp: 53037334 5 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.033 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808630 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 8

exp: 53037334 8 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.036 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808649 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 10

exp: 53037334 10 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.039 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808657 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 11

exp: 53037334 11 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.041 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808665 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 20

exp: 53037334 20 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.045 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808673 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 21

exp: 53037334 21 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.047 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808681 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 23

exp: 53037334 23 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.049 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $0130580869X 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 24

exp: 53037334 24 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.052 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808703 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 25

exp: 53037334 25 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.055 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808711 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 36

exp: 53037334 36 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.057 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $0130580872X 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 49

exp: 53037334 49 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.069 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808738 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 54

exp: 53037334 54 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.071 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808746 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 107

exp: 53037334 107 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.074 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808754 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 108

exp: 53037334 108 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.076 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808762 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 204

exp: 53037334 204 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.079 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808770 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH 

lok: 53037334 205

exp: 53037334 205 1 #EPN
201B/01 $007-06-25 $t02:11:38.081 
201C/01 $007-06-25 
201U/01 $0utf8 
203@/01 $01305808789 
208@/01 $a07-06-25 $bl 
209S/01 $S0 $uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50984 $XH

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Nash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox

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