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Szenarien der Europäischen Währungsunion und der Bankenregulierung

Titel:	Szenarien der Europäischen Währungsunion und der Bankenregulierung / von Jürgen von Hagen, Bernd Kubista, Ernst-Moritz Lipp, Stefan Lutz, Manfred J. M. Neumann, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Bernd Rudolph, Jürgen Siebke ; herausgegeben von Dieter Duwendag
Verfasser:	Hagen, Jürgen von
Beteiligt:	Duwendag, Dieter
Veröffentlicht:	Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 1997
Umfang:	1 Online-Ressource (158 pages) : illustrations
Format:	E-Book
Sprache:	Deutsch
Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk:	Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften ; n.F., Bd. 248
RVK-Notation:	QM 333 · QM 430
Schlagworte:	Europäische Union Währungsunion Kreditwesen Regulierung Konferenzschrift Frankfurt, Main
Andere Ausgaben:	Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe: Hagen, Jürgen von. Szenarien der Europäischen Währungsunion und der Bankenregulierung. - Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, ©1997
ISBN:	9783428489602 ; 342808960X ; 9783428089604

Bemerkung:	Includes bibliographical references
Zusammenfassung:	In summary, the seven contributions in the volume offer the program announced in the title: scenarios on the micro and macro effects of the European Monetary Union (EMU), scenarios of the monetary instruments of the European Central Bank and scenarios for the design of banking regulation against the background of globalized financial markets and the rapid growth of financial innovations. The contributions were presented at the 27th meeting of the Committee on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy in February 1996. "Hard" or "soft" interpretation of the Maastricht fiscal criteria? In an empirical simulation study, Jürgen von Hagen and Stefan Lutz come to the conclusion that a "hard" interpretation would lead to severe recessions and incompatibilities with the inflation criterion. According to the simulations by Manfred J. M. Neumann, the transition from the EMS to the EMU is associated with very different welfare losses for countries with a different stability culture, which would have to be compensated for. According to Jürgen Siebke's analysis, the still significant differences in the instrument mix of the EU countries must be adjusted in order to be able to provide central bank money under uniform conditions in an EMU. The competition problems and transition scenarios on the way to EMU show quite significant differences for large and small banks, as Bernd Kubista and Ernst-Moritz Lipp point out - each from their own perspective. Against the background of spectacular banking crises, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa discusses the question of market or regulatory failure and argues for "market-friendly" approaches to banking regulation within the framework of closer global cooperation. This latter conclusion is also reached in the contribution by Bernd Rudolph, whose main concern is the control of market and derivative risks and thus ultimately of systemic risk...

Bemerkung:

Includes bibliographical references

Zusammenfassung:

In summary, the seven contributions in the volume offer the program announced in the title: scenarios on the micro and macro effects of the European Monetary Union (EMU), scenarios of the monetary instruments of the European Central Bank and scenarios for the design of banking regulation against the background of globalized financial markets and the rapid growth of financial innovations. The contributions were presented at the 27th meeting of the Committee on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy in February 1996. "Hard" or "soft" interpretation of the Maastricht fiscal criteria? In an empirical simulation study, Jürgen von Hagen and Stefan Lutz come to the conclusion that a "hard" interpretation would lead to severe recessions and incompatibilities with the inflation criterion. According to the simulations by Manfred J. M. Neumann, the transition from the EMS to the EMU is associated with very different welfare losses for countries with a different stability culture, which would have to be compensated for. According to Jürgen Siebke's analysis, the still significant differences in the instrument mix of the EU countries must be adjusted in order to be able to provide central bank money under uniform conditions in an EMU. The competition problems and transition scenarios on the way to EMU show quite significant differences for large and small banks, as Bernd Kubista and Ernst-Moritz Lipp point out - each from their own perspective. Against the background of spectacular banking crises, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa discusses the question of market or regulatory failure and argues for "market-friendly" approaches to banking regulation within the framework of closer global cooperation. This latter conclusion is also reached in the contribution by Bernd Rudolph, whose main concern is the control of market and derivative risks and thus ultimately of systemic risk...

Szenarien der Europäischen Währungsunion und der Bankenregulierung

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