US extended nuclear deterrence in Europe: three scenarios
| Titel: | US extended nuclear deterrence in Europe: three scenarios : crisis of trust, breach of trust and full disengagement / Liviu Horovitz ; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - German Institute for International and Security Affairs |
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| Verfasser: | |
| Körperschaft: | |
| Veröffentlicht: | Berlin : SWP, [July 2025] |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (7 Seiten) |
| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk: |
SWP comment ; 2025, no. 32 (July 2025) |
| Einheitssachtitel: | Die erweiterte nukleare Abschreckung der USA in Europa - drei Szenarien |
| Andere Ausgaben: |
Übersetzung von: Horovitz, Liviu, 1983 -. Die erweiterte nukleare Abschreckung der USA in Europa - drei Szenarien. - Berlin : SWP, 2025. - 1 Online-Ressource (8 Seiten)
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