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Strategic transparency and electoral pressure

Titel:	Strategic transparency and electoral pressure [Elektronische Ressource] / Laura Moretti and Toru Suzuki
Verfasser:	Moretti, Laura
Beteiligt:	Suzuki, Toru
Ausgabe:	December 4, 2012
Veröffentlicht:	Frankfurt am Main : Univ.-Bibliothek, 2013
Umfang:	Online-Ressource
Format:	E-Book
Sprache:	Englisch
Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk:	CFS working paper series ; 2012,19
Schlagworte:	Amtsträger Fiskalpolitik Transparenz Wahl Online-Publikation

Zusammenfassung:	This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.

Zusammenfassung:

This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.

Strategic transparency and electoral pressure

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