Strategic transparency and electoral pressure
| Titel: | Strategic transparency and electoral pressure [Elektronische Ressource] / Laura Moretti and Toru Suzuki |
|---|---|
| Verfasser: | |
| Beteiligt: | |
| Ausgabe: | December 4, 2012 |
| Veröffentlicht: | Frankfurt am Main : Univ.-Bibliothek, 2013 |
| Umfang: | Online-Ressource |
| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Schriftenreihe/ mehrbändiges Werk: |
CFS working paper series ; 2012,19 |
X
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